The International Atomic Energy Agency’s Board of Governors is considering a request to implement additional inspections under a U.S.-Saudi nuclear safeguards agreement, as European governments press Riyadh to accept broader verification powers.

In his November 18 statement to the board, Director General Rafael Grossi said the United States and Saudi Arabia submitted the request in October. The agency’s secretariat recommends authorizing him to apply the additional measures. His statement describes a recommendation before the board, rather than an adopted decision.

The arrangement would give the IAEA information about, and access to, sites for uranium conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication and reprocessing developed, supplied, built or operated under the U.S.-Saudi cooperation agreement. It also covers associated research and manufacturing of nuclear equipment. Grossi said it would preserve the agency’s existing rights and obligations under Saudi Arabia’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

What the extra inspections would cover

IAEA analyst Stephanie Poirier briefs a group of visitors beside a table in Vienna
IAEA analyst Stephanie Poirier explains safeguards activities to visitors in Vienna on March 27, 2019.Dean Calma / IAEA / CC BY 2.0

The European Union’s statement Wednesday supports the additional measures but says they would not replace an Additional Protocol, a separate arrangement that expands the IAEA’s verification authority.

Without an Additional Protocol, the EU says, the agency can verify that declared nuclear material has not been diverted, but cannot provide credible assurances about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. The EU urged Saudi Arabia to conclude one.

The EU also noted the United States and Saudi Arabia’s commitment to reimburse the agency’s costs for implementing the additional measures. That funding commitment is separate from the question of how widely inspectors can look for undeclared activity.

Congress is reviewing the U.S. agreement

The Energy Department announced the signing of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement and accompanying safeguards agreement on July 22. The department presents the partnership as an opportunity for American nuclear suppliers and supply chains.

A November 16 Congressional Research Service report says the proposed cooperation agreement does not authorize the transfer of enrichment technology. The bilateral safeguards agreement would have to enter into force before the United States provided consent for enrichment or support for an enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia.

The congressional review has two periods totaling 90 days of continuous session. That is not a 90-calendar-day deadline. After the review, the agreement can proceed unless Congress adopts a resolution of disapproval that becomes law. An affirmative congressional approval vote is not the general statutory requirement described by CRS.

The report says review may conclude in December. It also notes that two accompanying side letters were submitted to Congress but have not been publicly released.